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Elliptic Curve Based Security Processor for RFID
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Abstract— RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) tags need to
include security functions, yet at the same time their resources are
extremely limited. Moreover, to provide privacy, authentication
and protection against tracking of RFID tags without loosing the
system scalability, a public-key based approach is inevitable. In
this paper, we present an architecture of a state-of-the-art pro-
cessor for RFID tags with an Elliptic Curve (EC) processor over
GF(2163). It shows the plausibility of meeting both security and
efficiency requirements even in a passive RFID tag. The proposed
processor is able to perform EC scalar multiplications as well as
general modular arithmetic (additions and multiplications) which
are needed for the cryptographic protocols. As we work with
large numbers, the register file is the most critical component in
the architecture. By combining several techniques, we are able to
reduce the number of registers from 9 to 6 in the EC processor. To
obtain an efficient modulo arithmetic, we introduce a redundant
modular operation. Moreover, the proposed architecture can
support multiple cryptographic protocols. The synthesis results
with a 0.13 µm CMOS technology show that the gate area of the
most compact version is 12.5 Kgates.
Index Terms— RFID systems, Security Processor, Elliptic
Curve Cryptography, Scalable Hardware, Arithmetic and Logic
Units, Public Key Cryptosystems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing an RFID system is one of the most challenging
tasks since it requires compact and power efficient solutions,
especially when security related processing is needed. The
most commonly required security properties are anti-cloning
and un-tractability. Besides these security properties, the sys-
tems should be scalable since the number of tags can be very
large. For example, it can be millions for large libraries or
warehouses. To satisfy those security and system requirements,
it is proven that a public key cryptosystem is necessary [1].
An Elliptic Curve (EC) based cryptosystem would be one of
the best candidates for the RFID systems due to its small key
size and efficient computation.
In this paper, the proposed RFID processor is composed
of a micro controller, an EC processor (ECP) and a bus
manager, where the ECP is over GF(2163). For an efficient
computation with restrictions on the gate area and the number
of cycles, several techniques are introduced in the algorithms
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and the architecture level. The optimization techniques can be
considered in two parts: the ECP and the micro controller.
First, noting that the ECP is dominated by the registers due
to a large key size of 163 bits, the optimization of the ECP
is mostly concentrated on the register file. By proposing a
common Z coordinate system (and its corresponding for-
mulae) and by introducing a register reuse technique, we
reduce the number of registers from 9 to 6. In addition, we
design a new register file architecture which reduces around
30% of gate area of the register file with small overhead in
cycles. Second, the micro controller is designed to perform
general modular operations efficiently. For efficient general
modular operations, we propose a redundant representation
which results in an efficient computation with less memory
compared to conventional methods.
Those techniques result in the most compact ECP of 10.1
Kgates with 276 Kcycles for one point multiplication. The
ECP is attached to the micro controller of a tag. General
modular operations are also needed for the computation of the
authentication protocols. In general, the minimally required
operations are modular additions and multiplications. The
modular additions and multiplications take 574 cycles and 25
Kcycles respectively for a word size of 163 bits. Since the
modular operations can be performed in parallel with the EC
scalar multiplication, the former operations do not contribute
to the latency. As a result, the overall architecture takes 12.5
Kgates. The architecture is also scalable in the digit size of the
ECP (the ECP’s ALU performs the field multiplication in digit
serial), and hence a better performance can be easily obtained.
We also demonstrate the proposed processor for an EC based
authentication protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect.
II, an overview of arithmetic operations for EC cryptography is
introduced, and in Sect. III, the starting points are summarized.
The system overview of the proposed RFID processor architec-
ture is shown in Sect. IV, and several techniques to minimize
the ECP are described in Sect. V. The architecture and the
instructions of the RFID micro controller are given in Sect.
VI, and the synthesis results and the performance analysis are
summarized in Sect. VII followed by the conclusion in Sect.
VIII.
II. OVERVIEW OF ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS FOR
ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) includes protocols that
are based on arithmetic of elliptic curves. Curves that are
commonly used in applications are usually defined over GF(p)
or GF(2n), where p is a prime number. Elliptic curve systems
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over both types of fields provide the same level of security
but the so-called binary fields have some implementation
advantages. Namely, binary arithmetic is “carry-free”, squaring
can be implemented very efficiently in some cases etc. The
properties are very convenient for hardware implementations.
Binary fields offer also more arithmetic options as there are
many choices for bases, irreducible polynomials, fields, etc.
In general, the elliptic curve arithmetic consists of several
hierarchical levels. The top level is EC scalar multiplication
which is executed by point addition and doubling. The point
operations can be performed by different formulae, which
depend on the representation chosen i.e. coordinates. The
formulae for point arithmetic are sequences of finite field
operations: addition/subtraction, multiplication/squaring and
inversion.
A. EC Scalar Multiplication
All ECC protocols include one (or a few) scalar or point
multiplications. This operation is achieved by repeated point
additions and doublings. The basic algorithm for scalar mul-
tiplication is the so-called binary method [2].
Algorithm 1 Scalar multiplication: Binary method [2]
Require: A point P , a t-bit integer k, k =
(kt−1, kt−2, · · · k0)2, ki ∈ {0, 1}
Ensure: Q = kP
1: Q← O;
2: for i from t− 1 down to 0 do
3: Q← 2Q;
4: If ki = 1, then Q← Q+ P ;
5: end for
6: Return Q;
For scalar multiplication one often chooses the Montgomery
ladder [3]. In the Montgomery ladder the computation is
balanced and independent of ki in the iteration, and therefore,
it is secure against simple side channel attacks.
Algorithm 2 Montgomery ladder [3]
Require: a t-bit integer k > 0 and a point P
Ensure: kP
1: k ← 1, kt−2, ..., k1, k0;
2: P1 ← P , P2 ← 2P ;
3: for i from t− 2 down to 0 do
4: If ki = 1 then P1 ← P1 + P2, P2 ← 2P2;
5: else P2 ← P2 + P1, P1 ← 2P1;
6: end for
7: Return P1;
For the point operation exist several formulae depending
on the choice of coordinates. For example, formulae based
on affine coordinates and projective coordinates can be found
in [6] and [9] respectively. Projective coordinates is commonly
used to avoid the field inversion.
1) Common Input: The set of system parameters consists of:
(q, a, b, P, n, h). Here, q specifies the finite field, a, b,
define an elliptic curve, P is a point on the curve of order
n and h is the cofactor.
2) Prover-Tag Input: The secret k such that Z = −k · P .
3) Protocol: It involves exchange of the following messages:
Prover P Verifier V
r ∈R Zn
X ← r · P X -
eﬀ e ∈R Zn
y = (ke+ r) mod n y -
If y ·P +e ·Z =
X then accept,
else reject.
Fig. 1. Schnorr’s identification protocol.
B. General Modular Arithmetic Operation
Besides the EC scalar multiplier, general modular arithmetic
operations are required to perform the cryptographic protocols.
For example, the Schnorr protocol [4] is shown in Fig. 1. When
the prover calculates y(= ke + r mod n), general modular
operations (multiplication and addition) should be performed.
General modular operations include also the reduction opera-
tion. Efficient reduction is possible for Mersenne primes, but
since n is the order of a curve, the reduction should work for an
arbitrary n. In this case, the reduction needs more computation
than the addition and multiplication themselves.
There exist efficient reduction algorithms such as Mont-
gomery’s reduction algorithm [7] and Barrett’s algorithm [8].
However, since Montgomery’s algorithm requires the trans-
formation overhead, it is not convenient to use it in this
situation. In Barrett’s algorithm the reduction can be performed
after calculating the multiplication and the quotient. Hence,
it requires temporary memory of 5 times the size of n.
Considering the scarceness of resources in the RFID systems,
the required memory should be minimized.
In this paper, we propose a redundant representation based
on the addition of a few guard bits for general modular
operations, which is efficient and requires a small temporary
memory as will be explained in detail in Sect. VI.
III. STARTING POINTS
In this section we describe two building blocks that are
our starting points. The first one is the Montgomery ladder
with the Lo´pez-Dahab algorithm. This approach allows an
implementation that does not need the storage of the Y -
coordinate. The second one is a compact arithmetic unit to
perform the field operations.
A. Montgomery ladder with Lo´pez-Dahab algorithm
The Montgomery ladder with Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm
shown by Alg. 3 uses a projective coordinate system. The point
addition formulae of (XAdd, ZAdd)← Madd(X1, Z1, X2, Z2)
are defined by Eq. (1).
ZAdd = (X1 · Z2 +X2 · Z1)2, (1)
XAdd = x · ZAdd + (X1 · Z2) · (X2 · Z1).
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Algorithm 3 Montgomery ladder with Lo´pez-Dahab algorithm [9]
Require: An elliptic curve y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, a point
P , a t-bit integer k, k = (1, kt−2, · · · k0)2, ki ∈ {0, 1}
Ensure: Q = kP
1: If (k = 0 or x = 0) then output (0, 0) and stop;
2: X1 ← x, Z1 ← 1, X2 ← x4 + b, Z2 ← x2;
3: for i from t− 2 down to 0 do
4: If ki = 1 then
5: (X1, Z1)← Madd(X1, Z1, X2, Z2),
6: (X2, Z2)← Mdouble(X2, Z2);
7: else (X2, Z2)← Madd(X2, Z2, X1, Z1),
8: (X1, Z1)← Mdouble(X1, Z1);
9: end for
10: Return Q← Mxy(X1, Z1, X2, Z2);
The doubling formulae of (XDouble, ZDouble) ←
Mdouble(X2, Z2) for the case of ki = 0 are defined
by Eq. (2).
ZDouble = (X2 · Z2)2, (2)
XDouble = X42 + b · Z42 .
Q ← Mxy(X1, Z1, X2, Z2) is the conversion from projec-
tive coordinate to affine coordinate. Lo´pez-Dahab’s addition
and doubling algorithms are described in Table I where c2 = b.
The total number of registers required in Table I is 6, that is
for storage of X1, Z1, X2, Z2, T1 and T2. The required field
operations for the Addition Algorithm are 4 multiplications, 1
squaring and 2 additions, and for the Doubling Algorithm one
needs 2 multiplications, 4 squarings and 1 addition. Note that it
is not necessary to maintain Y -coordinate during the iterations
since it can be derived at the end of the computation.
TABLE I
LO´PEZ-DAHAB’S ADDITION AND DOUBLING ALGORITHMS
Addition Algorithm Doubling Algorithm
(X1, Z1)←Madd(X1, Z1, X2, Z2) (X,Z)←Mdouble(X,Z)
1. T1 ← x 1. T1 ← c
2. X1 ← X1 · Z2 2. X ← X2
3. Z1 ← Z1 ·X2 3. Z ← Z2
4. T2 ← X1 · Z1 4. T1 ← Z · T1
5. Z1 ← Z1 +X1 5. Z ← Z ·X
6. Z1 ← Z21 6. T1 ← T 21
7. X1 ← Z1 · T1 7. X ← X2
8. X1 ← X1 + T2 8. X ← X + T1
B. Modular Arithmetic Logic Unit (MALU)
In order to perform the field operations, i.e. the multi-
plications, squarings and additions in Table I, we need a
Modular Arithmetic Logic Unit so-called MALU. The MALU
architecture is a compact architecture which performs the
arithmetic field operations shown by Eq. (3) [12].
A(x) = B(x) · C(x) mod P (x) if cmd = 1, (3)
A(x) = A(x) + C(x) mod P (x) if cmd = 0,
where A(x) = Σaixi, B(x) = Σbixi, C(x) = Σcixi and
P (x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1.
In the MALU, the squaring operation uses the same logic as
the multiplication by duplicating the operand. With a digit size
of d, the field multiplication and addition take
⌈
163
d
⌉
and one
cycle respectively. The benefit of this architecture is that the
multiplication and addition operations share the XOR array
and by increasing the digit size, the MALU can be easily
scaled. More explanation about the MALU is given in Sect. V.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The RFID processor is composed of a micro controller, a
bus manager and an EC processor (ECP). It is connected with
a front end module, a random number generater (RNG), ROM
and RAM as illustrated in Fig. 2. A front end module includes
an antenna, an A/D (Analog to Digital) converter, a modulator
and a demodulator, and provides an interface with the bus
manager on a 8-bit bus. The solid lines are for data exchange,
the dash lines with numbers are for addressing, and the dash
lines without numbers are control signals.
RFID Processor
RAM
ROM
RNG
Front End Module
Register File
  (163 bits * 6)
MALU
Ctl 163
Micro Controller
Serial
 * / +
   8 bit
Registers
8
8
10
88
13
 8
   Bus
Manager
EC Processor
Fig. 2. Proposed RFID Processor Architecture
The ROM stores program codes and data. The program is
executed by the micro controller and the data may include
a tag’s private key, the server’s public key and system pa-
rameters. The program is basically an authentication protocol.
Hardwiring of an authentication protocol is not a flexible
solution because protocols are often changed due to a constant
progress in cryptanalysis. Therefore, we choose a design which
can be programmed for several authentication protocols even
after ASIC is produced. The private key and the system
parameters should be changeable since the private key of a
tag should be different for each tag and the system parameters
could be different depending on RFID system users. Therefore,
the used ROM should be EPROM or EEPROM. RAM is used
to store intermediate or final results of calculations by the
micro controller and the ECP. Even though we exclude RAM
and ROM from our design, they should be embedded in the
design when the actual ASIC is produced.
The micro controller is able to perform general modular
arithmetic operations (additions and multiplications) in a byte-
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serial fashion. It also gives commands for the execution of the
ECP via the bus manager.
The ECP loads a key (k) and an EC point (P ) from ROM
or RAM and executes the EC scalar multiplication (kP ). After
finishing the scalar multiplication, it stores the results in RAM.
The bus manager takes a role as the bridge for the data
flow from/to outside of the RFID processor. It also arbitrates
the memory access of the micro controller and the ECP. A
higher priority is given on the ECP than the micro controller
since the execution time is more critical in the former. For this
priority setting, the ECP signals the bus manager in advance
of memory access.
V. ELLIPTIC CURVE PROCESSOR
A. Implementation Considerations
If Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm is implemented based on the
MALU in a conventional way, the total number of registers
is 9, i.e. 3 registers for the MALU plus 6 registers for the
Montgomery ladder algorithm. In [13], 3 registers and 5 RAMs
are used (8 memory elements in total). One register is reduced
by modifying Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm and assuming that
constants can be loaded directly to the MALU without using a
register. In our architecture, we are able to reduce the number
of registers to 6 even without relying on these assumptions.
As the registers occupy more than 80% of the gate area in a
conventional architecture, reducing the number of the registers
and the complexity of the register file are very effective to
minimize the total gate area.
Accordingly, our compact architecture achieves two things:
reducing the number of registers (one register reduction by
using the common Z projective coordinate system and two
registers reduction by register reuse) [14] and designing a
compact register file architecture by limiting the access to the
registers.
B. Common Z Projective Coordinate System
We propose new formulae for the common Z projective
coordinate system where the Z values of two elliptic curve
points in the Montgomery ladder algorithm are kept the
same during the process. New formulae for the common Z
projective coordinate system have been proposed over prime
fields in [10]. However, this work is different from ours. First,
they made new formulae over a prime field while ours is over
a binary field. Second, they made new formulae to reduce the
computation in a special addition chain while our formulae
slightly increase the computation amount in order to reduce
the number of the registers. Again, note that reducing even
one register decreases the total gate area considerably.
Since in Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm, two EC points must
be maintained during EC scalar multiplication, the required
number of registers is 4 (X1, Z1, X2 and Z2) and including 2
registers for intermediate values (T1 and T2), the total number
of registers is 6. The idea of the common Z projective coor-
dinate system is to make sure that Z1 = Z2 at each iteration
of Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm. This condition is satisfied at the
beginning of the iterations since the algorithm starts from
Z1 = Z2 = 1. Even if Z1 6= Z2, we can satisfy this condition
using three extra field multiplications as shown by Eq. (4)
where the resulting coordinate set is (X1, X2, Z).
X1 ← X1 · Z2,
X2 ← X2 · Z1, (4)
Z ← Z1 · Z2.
Since we now assume Z1 = Z2, we can start the point
addition algorithm with the common Z projective coordinate
system. With Z = Z1 = Z2, Eq. (1) is rewritten as shown by
Eq. (5). Now ZAdd and XAdd have a common factor of Z2.
ZAdd = (X1 · Z2 +X2 · Z1)2 = (X1 +X2)2 · Z2,
XAdd = x · ZAdd + (X1 · Z2) · (X2 · Z1) (5)
= x · ZAdd + (X1 ·X2 · Z2).
Due to the property of projective coordinate systems, we
can divide ZAdd and XAdd by the common factor Z2. The
comparison of the original equation with the modified equation
is summarized in Table II. Note that the new formula of the
point addition algorithm is independent of the previous Z-
coordinate value.
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL AND THE MODIFIED FORMULAE
The original equation The new equation assuming
Z = Z1 = Z2
ZAdd = (X1Z2 +X2Z1)
2 ZAdd = (X1 +X2)
2
XAdd = xZAdd +X1Z2X2Z1 XAdd = xZAdd +X1X2
In the point doubling algorithm, there is no such reduction
since it deals with only one EC point. Nevertheless, we can
simplify the point doubling algorithm by noticing that T 21 +
X2 ≡ (T1 +X)2 at the steps 6, 7 and 8 in Table I. One field
multiplication can be reduced using this mathematical equality.
Eq. (2) is rewritten as Eq. (6) where c2 = b.
ZDouble = (X2 · Z)2, (6)
XDouble = (X22 + c · Z2)2.
Note that the resulting Z-coordinate values are different
between the point addition and doubling formulae. In order
to maintain a common Z-coordinate value, extra steps similar
to Eq. (4) are required. These extra steps must follow every
pair of the point addition and doubling algorithms. The final
mathematical expression and its algorithm are shown by
Eq. (7) and Table III respectively.
X1 ← XAddZDouble =
{
x(X1 +X2)2 +X1X2
}
(X2Z)2,
X2 ← XDoubleZAdd = (X22 + cZ2)2(X1 +X2)2, (7)
Z ← ZAddZDouble = (X1 +X2)2(X2Z)2.
In Table III the mark of (T1) at each squaring operation
indicates that the T1 register is free to store some other value.
The reason for this will be explained in this section. The
comparison of the amount of field operations between Lo´pez-
Dahab’s algorithm and our algorithm is shown in Table IV.
Noting that the multiplication and the squaring are equiv-
alent in the MALU operation, the workload of our algorithm
is the same as that of Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm and we still
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TABLE III
PROPOSED POINT ADDITION AND DOUBLING ALGORITHMS
Addition Algorithm Doubling Algorithm Extra Steps
1. T2 ← X1 +X2 1. X2 ← X22 (T1) 1. X1 ← X1 · Z
2. T2 ← T 22 (T1) 2. Z ← Z2 (T1) 2. X2 ← X2 · T2
3. T1 ← X1 ·X2 3. T1 ← c 3. Z ← Z · T2
4. X1 ← x 4. T1 ← Z · T1
5. X1 ← T2 ·X1 5. Z ← Z ·X2
6. X1 ← X1 + T1 6. X2 ← X2 + T1
7. X2 ← X22 (T1)
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE COMPUTATIONAL WORKLOAD
Field Operation Lo´pez-Dahab’s algorithm Our algorithm
Multiplication 6 7
Squaring 5 4
Addition 3 3
reduce the storage by one register. Moreover, if an elliptic
curve with b = 1 is chosen in y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b, one
additional multiplication can be saved in the point doubling
algorithm. In our work, a is randomly selected and b = 1.
C. ECP’s MALU Architecture
The MALU architecture of the ECP, which reuses the
MALU in [12], is shown in Fig. 3. The registers in the MALU
are combined with the external registers to reduce the number
of registers. At the completion of the multiplication or addition
operation, only register RegA is updated while registers RegB
and RegC hold the same data as at the beginning of the
operations. Therefore, RegB and RegC can be used not only to
store field operands but also to store some intermediate values
of the proposed point addition and doubling algorithm where
we need five registers for X1, X2, Z, T1, and T2 in Table III.
An extra care should be taken at this point since the same
value must be placed in both of RegB and RegC for squaring.
Therefore, during squaring, only one register can be reused.
This fact would conflict with our purpose to reuse each
of RegB and RegC as a storage of the point addition and
doubling algorithms. Fortunately, it is possible to free one of
the registers to hold another value during squaring. As shown
in Table III, T1 can be reused whenever a squaring operation
is required.
In Fig. 3, cmd signals the command to perform multipli-
cation or addition as shown by Eq. (3). When the MALU
performs a multiplication, each digit of d bits of RegB must be
provided to the MALU. Instead of addressing each digit of the
163 bit word, the most significant digit (MSD) is provided and
a circular shift is performed by d bits. The shift operation must
be circular and the last shift must be the remainder of 163/d
since the value must be kept as the initial value at the end of
the operation. During the MALU operation, an intermediate
result is stored in RegA.
D. Circular Shift Register File Architecture
By reusing the MALU registers for the Montgomery ladder
algorithm, we reduce two of the registers as discussed in
the previous subsection. This means that all the registers of
the MALU and the Montgomery ladder algorithm should be
organized in a single register file. Therefore, the register file
of our system consists of six registers. We use a circular shift
register file to reduce the complexity of the multiplexer. The
area complexity of a multiplexer in a randomly accessible
register file increases as the square of the number of registers.
On the other hand, the area complexity of the multiplexer in a
circular shift register file is a constant. As a result, this model
reduces about 30% of the gate area of the register file.
Although the register file in Fig. 4 is a circular shift register
file, each register is independently controlled for the efficient
management. RegA is the only register that gets values from
outside of the register file. Data in is for the data from a
memory unit. This data can be either a scalar k or a point P for
EC point multiplications of k ·P . Since the data is input as 8
bits, RegA performs 8-bit shifts to keep the previously loaded
data. The signal ’1’ is for the initialization of the Z-coordinate
value. In the multiplexer for RegB, the shift of ’d’ positions
is a circular shift so that RegB goes back to the original value
after finishing the field multiplication. Except for RegA and
RegB, all the registers can be updated only by the preceding
register. Note that the multiplexers for RegC, RegD, RegE and
RegF are not implemented since the enable signals of flip-flops
can be utilized to indicate whether to update with new values
or to keep their previous values.
With the given multiplexers, any replacement or reordering
of the register values can be achieved. Since only RegA and
RegB get multiple inputs, only two fixed-sized multiplexers
are necessary. Note that RegA, RegB and RegC in Fig. 4 are
used as the three registers for the MALU in Fig. 3.
E. EC Processor (ECP) Architecture
EC Add&Doubler
EC Processor
Register File
MALU
Control1Control2
Bus Manager
8
8
8
163
Fig. 5. EC Processor Architecture
The ECP architecture is shown in Fig. 5. EC point add and
doubler (EC Add&Doubler) consists of Control1, the MALU
and the register file. Control1 receives the EC parameters and
gives the result of EC scalar multiplication through Control2.
Control2 conveys the data from/to Control1 and reads a key
(or a scalar) through the bus manager. The key is read in
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RegB<<d
(RegA<<8)
 # Data_in
Data_in
8
RegA RegB RegC RegD
D_sig
1
RegE RegF
E_sig
1
F_sig
1
Register File
MALU
Fig. 4. Register File Architecture
bytes and stored in one byte buffer in Control2. Control2 also
controls the EC Add&Doubler according to the Montgomery
algorithm in Alg. 3.
In our system, we assume that the coordinate conversion
to the affine coordinate system and the calculation of Y -
coordinate value are performed on a tag reader or a back-end
system.
F. Register File Management for Algorithm Implementation
The register file management for the point addition algo-
rithm is shown in Table V. Each step requires one cycle except
for the field multiplications and the read operation of x (step
14). The read operation of x requires 28 cycles, which is
composed of 7 cycles for the synchronization with the bus
manager and 21 cycles for the reading of 21 bytes.
For the field multiplication, only the final results are shown.
At the beginning of the operation, we assume that X2, X1
and Z are stored in RegA, RegB and RegC respectively.
RegD, RegE and RegF are marked with ’–’ since meaningful
values are not stored yet. On each step of the register file
management, each register value is updated according to the
architecture in Fig. 4. While RegA can be updated by either
RegB or RegF, the other registers can be updated only by
their preceding registers. During the procedure, registers are
marked with ’–’ whenever the previous values are not used
any more. The field addition and multiplication are performed
as RegA ← RegB × RegC and RegA ← RegA + RegC
respectively. The register file management for other parts can
be similarly described.
The use of this register file increases the number of cycles
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TABLE V
REGISTER FILE MANAGEMENT FOR THE ADDITION ALGORITHM
Step Field Operation RegA RegB RegC RegD RegE RegF cycles
(1) Initial X2 X1 Z – – – –
(2) X2 X2 X1 Z – – 1
(3) 1. T2 ← X1 +X2 T2 X2 X2 X1 Z – 1
(4) T2 T2 X2 X1 Z Z 1
(5) T2 T2 T2 X2 X1 Z 1
(6) 2. T2 ← T 22 T2 – – X2 X1 Z d163/de
(7) Z T2 – X2 X2 X1 1
(8) X1 Z T2 X2 X2 X2 1
(9) X2 X1 Z T2 X2 X2 1
(10) X2 X2 X1 Z T2 X2 1
(11) 3. T1 ← X1 ×X2 T1 X2 – Z T2 X2 d163/de
(12) X2 T1 – Z Z T2 1
(13) X2 X2 T1 Z Z T2 1
(14) 4. X1 ← x X1 X2 T1 Z Z T2 28
(15) T2 X1 X2 T1 Z T2 1
(16) T2 X1 X2 T1 T1 Z 1
(17) T2 T2 X1 X2 T1 Z 1
(18) 5. X1 ← T2 ×X1 X1 T2 – X2 T1 Z d163/de
(19) Z X1 T2 X2 T1 T1 1
(20) X1 Z T2 X2 X2 T1 1
(21) T1 X1 Z T2 X2 T1 1
(22) T1 X1 X1 Z T2 X2 1
(23) 6. X1 ← X1 + T1 X1 – – Z T2 X2 1
due to the control overhead. However, considering that a field
multiplication takes a large number of cycles, the number of
overhead cycles is relatively small. One thing that we need to
consider is the peak power consumption. If all the registers are
updated at the same time, the large peak power consumption
can be a problem. In the proposed architecture, at most 4
registers are updated at a time. This number can be reduced
up to 2 by introducing more overhead cycles, but it cannot be
less than 2, since the field multiplication in the MALU updates
2 registers.
VI. MICRO CONTROLLER
In general, modular additions and multiplications are needed
in protocols. Because they are not part of the critical calcula-
tions and thus do not contribute to the latency, we decided to
perform these modular operations on the 8-bit micro-controller
in a byte-serial fashion. In order to reduce the computation
amount of modular reductions, we use a form of redundant
representation by using 5 extra guard bits.
A. General Modular Arithmetic Operation
All the scalar values are 163 bits long, so a scalar needs 21
bytes (168 bits) in an 8-bit controller. Therefore, we can utilize
the extra 5 bits as bits for computation efficiency without
extra overhead. In the redundant modular operation, a scalar
is not reduced to the fully minimized form of 163 bits but it
is allowed to have a length of 168 bits. Those extra guard bits
make the computation efficient.
1) Modular Addition with 8-bit ALU: We start the modular
operations assuming that all the scalars have a length of 168
bits. The modular addition is described in Alg. 4.
Algorithm 4 Modular Addition with 8-bit ALU
Require: A =
∑167
k=0 ak2
k
, B =
∑167
k=0 bk2
k
Ensure: C = A+B mod n
1: C ←Add(A,B);
2: C0 ←
∑166
k=0 ck2
k
, D ←∑1k=0 ck+1672k,
C1 ←Multiply(N1, D);
3: C ←Add(C0, C1);
4: Return C;
The step 1 is for addition and the step 2 and 3 are for
reduction where N1 = 2167 mod n. To provide the validity
of the reduction, we consider Eq. (8).
C mod n =
(
168∑
k=0
ck2k
)
mod n (8)
=
(
166∑
k=0
ck2k + 2167 ·
1∑
k=0
ck+1672k
)
mod n
=
(
166∑
k=0
ck2k +N1 ·
1∑
k=0
ck+1672k
)
mod n.
Since the size of N1 is 163 bits, N1 ·
∑1
k=0 ck+1672
k is 165
bits long and the final result will be up to 168 bits. Therefore,
the modular addition requires two Add(·, ·) operations and
one Multiply(·, ·) operation. Add(·, ·) and Multiply(·, ·) are
described in Alg. 5 and 6 respectively. Though the inputs of
Add(·, ·) in Alg. 4 are 21 bytes long, Add(·, ·) is defined for
22-byte inputs so that it can be used for the reduction of the
modular multiplication as well.
In Alg. 5 CarryBit is a one-bit variable which stores the
carry of the addition of two one-byte values. A(i) is i-th byte
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Algorithm 5 Addition of 22-byte operands: C←ADD(A,B)
Require: A =
∑175
k=0 ak2
k
, B =
∑175
k=0 bk2
k
Ensure: C = A+B
1: CarryBit ← 0;
2: for i from 0 to 21 do
3: A(i) ←∑7k=0 a8i+k2k, B(i) ←∑7k=0 b8i+k2k;
4: {C(i), CarryBit} ← A(i) +B(i) + CarryBit;
5: end for
6: C(22) ← CarryBit;
7: Return C;
of A. In Alg. 6 CarryByte is a one-byte variable which stores
the most significant byte of the multiplication of two one-byte
values. M0 is the least significant byte and M1 is the most
significant byte of A(i) ×D.
Algorithm 6 Multiplication of 21-byte value by 1-byte value:
C←Multiply(A,B)
Require: A =
∑167
k=0 ak2
k
, D =
∑7
k=0 dk2
k
Ensure: C = A ·D
1: CarryByte ← 0, CarryBit ← 0;
2: for i from 0 to 20 do
3: A(i) ←∑7k=0 a8i+k2k;
4: {M0,M1} ← A(i) ·D;
5: {C(i), CarryBit} ←M0 + CarryByte + CarryBit;
6: CarryByte ←M1;
7: end for
8: C(21) ← CarryByte + CarryBit;
9: Return C;
2) Modular Multiplication with 8-bit ALU: The algorithm
of byte-serial modular multiplication is described in Alg. 7.
Algorithm 7 Modular Multiplication with 8-bit ALU
Require: A =
∑k=167
k=0 ak2
k
, B =
∑k=167
k=0 bk2
k
Ensure: C = A ·B mod n
1: for i from 20 down to 0 do
2: C0 ← 28 · C0;
3: D ←∑7k=0 b8i+k2k,
C1 ←Multiply(A,D);
4: C ← Add(C0, C1);
5: C0 ←
∑169
k=0 ck2
k
, D ←∑7k=0 ck+1702k,
C1 ←Multiply(N2, D);
6: C ← Add(C0, C1);
7: C0 ←
∑166
k=0 ck2
k
, D ←∑3k=0 ck+1672k,
C1 ←Multiply(N1, D);
8: C ← Add(C0, C1);
9: end for
10: Return C;
The steps 2–4 are for 1-byte shift, multiplication by one
byte and accumulation. The remainder steps 5–8 are for the
reduction, whose validity is described by Eq. (9) and (10)
where N1 = 2167 mod n and N2 = 2170 mod n. The size
of C before the reduction, i.e. in the step 4, is 177 bits since
the both of C0 and C1 are 176 bits long and the addition of
the two will produce up to 177 bits. Eq. (9) describes the steps
5 and 6, and Eq. (10) describes the steps 7 and 8 in Alg. 7.
C mod n =
(
176∑
k=0
ck2k
)
mod n (9)
=
(
169∑
k=0
ck2k + 2170 ·
6∑
k=0
ck+1702k
)
mod n
=
(
169∑
k=0
ck2k +N2 ·
6∑
k=0
ck+1702k
)
mod n = C ′.
In Eq. (9), since the size of N2 is 163 bits and the size of
N2 ·
∑6
k=0 ck+1702
k is 170 bits, the size of C ′ is at most 171
bits. C ′ can be reduced again according to Eq. (10).
C ′ mod n =
(
170∑
k=0
c′k2
k
)
mod n (10)
=
(
166∑
k=0
c′k2
k + 2167 ·
3∑
k=0
c′k+1672
k
)
mod n
=
(
166∑
k=0
c′k2
k +N1 ·
3∑
k=0
c′k+1672
k
)
mod n.
Since the size of N1 is 163 bits and the size of N1 ·∑3
k=0 c
′
k+1672
k is 167 bits, the size of the final result is at
most 168 bits. Therefore, the reduced C (i.e. C after finishing
the step 8 in Alg. 7) can be used for the next iteration.
3) Comparison with Barrett’s Modular Reduction in mod-
ular multiplication: Barrett’s algorithm [8] is one of the most
efficient modular reduction algorithms for a general number n.
Let the size of n is t bits and M = A×B where we calculate
A × B mod n. The Barrett’s reduction can be expressed by
Eq. (11).
µ =
⌊
22t
n
⌋
,
q′ =
⌊⌊
M
2t
⌋
· µ
2t
⌋
, (11)
R =M − q′ · n.
µ can be pre-calculated and hence it does not contribute to the
computation amount. Since R is congruent to M mod n and
R < 3n, the final result requires at most two t-bit subtractions
after calculating R. Therefore, the required computation in the
worst case is two t-bit multiplications, one 2t-bit subtraction
and two t-bit subtractions. For the calculation, it requires 5t-
bit temporary memory since M requires 2t-bit memory, q′
requires t-bit memory and the result of q′ ·n needs to be stored
in separate 2t-bit memory. Therefore the required memory is
105 bytes if t is 163 and the unit of memory is 8 bits (each t
bits will need 21 bytes).
In the proposed modular multiplication of Alg. 7, the steps
3–4 are for the multiplications and steps 5–8 are for the
reduction. The complexity of the reduction is exactly two n-bit
multiplication and the required temporary memory is 44 bytes.
Therefore, the proposed modular reduction is more efficient in
both computation and memory. The comparison between two
algorithms is summarized in Table VII.
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TABLE VI
RAM USAGE FOR MODULAR MULTIPLICATION
Block # Initial 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8)
0 C(168) C0(176) C0(176) C(177) C0(170) C(171) C0(167) C(168)
1 C1(176) C1(170) C1(167)
2 A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168)
3 B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168)
TABLE VII
RAM USAGE FOR MODULAR MULTIPLICATION
Reduction Computation Memory
Algorithm Complexity Requirement
two t-bit multiplications
Barrett’s Algorithm one 2t-bit subtraction 105 bytes
two t-bit subtractions
Proposed Algorithm two t-bit multiplications 44 bytes
B. 8-bit ALU
ALU has an 8-bit adder and an 8-bit multiplier. The detailed
algorithms for general modular operations are implemented in
hardware and performed using these two blocks.
C. Addressing and Memory Management
TABLE VIII
PHYSICAL MEMORY ADDRESS MAP
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Device ID(4) Block Address(4) Byte Address(5)
The addressing is composed of 13 bits where the first two
4-bits are used for a device ID and a block address, and the
last 5 bits for a byte address. The device ID indicates ROM for
the program, ROM for data, RAM, RNG, the front end module
and the ECP. The block address and the byte address are used
only for ROM and RAM. Even the non-memory devices are
memory mapped so that the micro controller gives an input or
gets an output.
Since all the scalar values are 21 bytes long, each block
is composed of 21 bytes. All the basic data managements are
based on blocks. This makes the program and the control very
simple. For example, the program needs to specify only the
block address for the general modular operations.
The process of intermediate value storage for the modular
addition is described in Table IX where we assume the
operands of the modular addition are stored in Block 2 and
Block 3. The numbering of 1), 2) and 3) indicate the steps of
Alg. 4 and the numbers inside of the parentheses are the size
of the variables in bit. For the modular addition, two blocks
of RAM must be reserved to hold intermediate values and the
final result.
The process of intermediate value storage for the modular
multiplication is described in Table VI where we assume the
operands are stored in Block 2 and Block 3, and the steps 1),
2) and etc. represent the steps of Alg. 7.
For the reduction, n is not used but N1 and N2 are used,
which should be pre-calculated and stored in ROM. The
TABLE IX
RAM USAGE FOR MODULAR ADDITION
Block # Initial 1) 2) 3)
0 C(169) C0(167) C(168)
1 C1(167)
2 A(168) A(168) A(168) A(168)
3 B(168) B(168) B(168) B(168)
modular multiplication also needs to reserve the first two
memory blocks in RAM, so they should not store meaningful
values before starting modular operations. Note that the size of
Block 0 and Block 1 is 22 bytes which is one byte larger than
the other blocks. Though the results of the modular operations
are not fully reduced in tags, such reduction can be taken care
of in the reader or the server.
D. ROM for data
There are some data which should be stored in tags for their
processing. The data may include the private key of a tag, the
public key of the reader and system parameters. If this kind
of data is hardwired, the architecture can be simplified since
tags do not need to access the memory and the hardwired
data is simpler than any other memory structure. However, the
hardwired data can not be changed if the architecture is once
produced as an ASIC. Therefore, some of the data should be
stored in non-volatile memory. Table X shows the ROM usage
of Schnorr protocol as an example where N1 and N2 are used
for general modular operations, k is the private key of a tag
and x(P ) is the X-coordinate value of the base point P .
TABLE X
ROM FOR SCHNORR PROTOCOL
Block Address in Data ROM 0 1 2 3
Data N1 N2 k x(P )
E. Instructions of the micro controller
The instructions must be carefully designed since they are
directly related to the system performance and the program
size. If the instructions are designed at a lower level, the
memory for a program will grow and the performance will be
degraded since most of the control must be done in software.
Instructions are at a high level to reduce the control overhead.
Programmability is still required as we want to use the device
for multiple protocols.
In the proposed architectures, the program is stored in ROM
starting from the address 0. Each instruction is composed of
1, 2 or 3 bytes, where the first byte is for a command and
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TABLE XI
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PROCESSOR
Instruction Description Number of cycles
Block Mov (A, B) Move one block of memory from the block address A to the block address B. 121
Block Add (A, B) Add the block A and the block B, and store in RAM[0]. 574
Block Mul (A, B) Multiply the block A by the block B, and store in RAM[0]. 25,486
Activate ECP (A) Start the ECP with k of RAM[4] and P of the block A: k · P . ≥ 11
(When the ECP finishes, the result is stored in RAM[2] and RAM[3])
Wait for ECP The processor waits until the ECP completes its computation. ≥ 10
End of code The end of the program. 6
the remainder bytes are for block addressing. Since most of
the data is constructed in blocks and the designed instructions
manipulate data in blocks, the program is significantly sim-
plified and the programmer does not have to care about the
detail of the computation. Since the block-level instructions
are implemented in hardware, the processor runs fast and
efficiently. Tab XI summarizes some important commands
where each of the instructions and operands is one byte and
RAM[i] is the i-th block of RAM.
Table XII shows an example program for the Schnorr
protocol of Fig. 1.
TABLE XII
PROGRAM FOR SCHNORR PROTOCOL
Program Code Comment
Block Mov (RNG, RAM[4]) Generate a block of random data and
store in RAM[4].
Activate ECP (ROM[3]) Start the ECP with X-coordinate value
of ROM[3].
Wait for ECP Wait until the ECP finishes.
Block Mov (RAM[2], Tran.) Transmit RAM[2].
Block Mov (RAM[3], Tran.) Transmit RAM[3].
Block Mov (Recv., RAM[2]) Receive a block and store in RAM[2].
Block Mul (ROM[2], RAM[2]) Do modular multiplication of ROM[2]
and RAM[2], and store in RAM[0].
Block Add (ROM[0], RAM[4]) Do Modular addition of ROM[0] and
RAM[4], and store in RAM[0].
Block Mov (RAM[0], Tran.) Transmit RAM[0].
End of code The end of the program.
VII. SYNTHESIS RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
TABLE XIV
EC PROCESSOR TYPES
An extra buffer register The register file type
Type 1 No Circular Shift Register File
Type 2 Yes Circular Shift Register File
Type 3 Yes Randomly Accessible Register File
In order to find the best tradeoffs, we have designed three
different architectures of the ECP as shown in Table XIV.
Type 1 is the minimal version described so far. Type 2 uses
an extra register to hold the X-coordinate value of the base
EC point (i.e. P at the EC scalar multiplication of k ·P ), say
x(P ). Therefore, this extra register makes the ECP load x(P )
only once and use for the whole calculation of an EC scalar
multiplication. Otherwise, the ECP has to load x(P ) at every
iteration in the Montgomery algorithm, which means that the
ECP has to load 163 times for a 163-bit key. Type 3 has
an extra register and a randomly accessible register file. The
use of the extra register and the randomly accessible register
file increase the gate area while reduce the number of cycles.
Therefore, the ECP Type 1 has the least gate area and the most
number of cycles and Type 3 has the most gate area and the
least number of cycles in the same digit size.
The proposed architectures are synthesized using a low
leakage power library of UMC’s 0.13 µm (fsc0l d sc tc.db).
The synthesized architectures include the micro controller, the
bus manager and the ECP corresponding to everything within
the dashed lines in Fig. 2. Some samples of the synthesis
results and the performances are shown in Table XIII. The
number of cycles is to finish the Schnorr protocol, which
includes one EC scalar multiplication, some general modu-
lar operations, the random number generation and the data
transmission/reception.
The clock frequency is chosen to finish the Schnorr protocol
within 250 msec and to be a factor of 13.56 MHz, i.e. the
carrier frequency of a reader in our system. Therefore, tags can
use a simple division logic of the carrier frequency for their
internal clock frequency so that a separate pulse generater is
not needed. Though the Schnorr protocol requires only one
EC scalar multiplication, some other protocols such as the
Okamoto protocol [5] requires two EC scalar multiplications.
We expect one EC scalar multiplication to finish in 250
msec so that even the protocols that have two EC scalar
multiplications can finish in 500 msec. 500 msec is a very
reasonable response time though it is too much delay for
sequential accesses of multiple tags. However, it is possible to
solve the throughput problem by applying a multiple access
protocol that can handle multiple tags in parallel. This is
possible because the most of the time taken in the processor
is caused by the calculation inside of tags and therefore, if
we can make multiple tags start the authentication in parallel
and the radio communication of each tag exclusive, the overall
throughput can be effectively increased.
The gate area is dominated by the register file. In order to
minimize the gate area, we minimize the flip-flops. The UMC
standard cell library of 0.13 µm offers a very compact D flip-
flop combined with a multiplexer, which can be implemented
in 6.25 gate area. In the case of Type 1 and the digit size of
1, the register file occupies 7.53 Kgates. This is around 7.7
gates per bit including the multiplexers.
The trade-offs of the gate area and the number of cycles
depending on the digit size are shown in Fig. 6 where each of
three line graphs represents each of different types. On each
graph the most left side dot is for the digit size of 1 and the
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TABLE XIII
SYNTHESIS RESULT AND PERFORMANCE
Type Digit ECP Overall
(1)
Cycles(2) Frequency Time
(2) Dynamic Leakage Total
Size Gate Area Gate Area (KHz) (msec) Power (µW ) Power (µW ) Power (µW )
1
1 10,106 12,506 302,457 1,130 244.43 36.5780 0.0509 36.6289
2 11,383 14,064 171,480 590 246.33 21.4927 0.0553 21.5480
3 12,236 14,729 127,821 411 247.18 15.6854 0.0609 15.7463
4 12,863 15,356 105,183 323 244.47 12.0117 0.0641 12.0758
5 13,497 15,989 92,247 266 248.20 11.3389 0.0674 11.4063
2
1 11,133 13,624 298,111 1,130 240.58 38.6624 0.0559 38.7183
2 12,696 15,191 167,136 565 249.35 22.5107 0.0622 22.5729
3 13,319 15,808 123,475 399 243.77 16.0403 0.0654 16.1057
4 13,934 16,433 100,837 301 247.51 12.7105 0.0686 12.7791
5 14,570 17,251 87,901 251 245.50 11.0944 0.0721 11.1665
3
1 14,307 16,799 293,587 1,130 236.58 43.3769 0.0673 43.4442
2 15,967 18,451 162,608 565 241.33 24.0127 0.0751 24.0878
3 16,568 19,074 118,951 377 246.10 16.7974 0.0783 16.8757
4 17,200 19,693 96,311 283 247.99 13.0870 0.0814 13.1684
5 17,837 20,316 83,375 230 248.54 11.1542 0.0845 11.2387
(1) The synthesis results are for RFID processor which includes the micro controller, the bus manager and ECP.
(2) The number of cycles and the time are to complete the Schnorr protocol of Fig. 1 and Table XII.
digit size grows one by one through the most right side dot
until the digit size of 10. The most compact architecture is
Type 1 with the digit size of 1. If the digit size is increased
to more than 5, Type 2 shows better performance than Type
1 in terms of the cycle number and area product. Again if the
digit size of Type 2 is increased enough, Type 3 will show
better performance. This result is due to a constant factor in
the number of cycles which is independent of the digit size
in Type 1. Note that Type 1 has to perform some register file
management operations due to its special architecture of the
shift register file and also has to load the X-coordinate value
of the base EC point at each iteration in the Montgomery
algorithm. Type 2 also has some constant factor of the cycles
due to the shift register file management but it is smaller than
Type 1. Since Type 3 does not have such constant factors,
the number of cycles can be more effectively decreased by
increasing the digit size.
One of the most important factors in RFID tags is the power
consumption especially if tags are passive. In order to get the
average power estimation in the gate level, we used Design
Vision and ModelSim SE. We generated VCD (Value Change
Dump) files in ModelSim using a test bench data. Then, VCD
files are translated to SAIF (Switching Activity Interchange
Format) files, which are used in Design Vision to get average
power consumptions. Since we used a low leakage power
library of UMC, the leakage power is negligible as shown
in Table XIII.
Fig. 7 shows the synthesis results for the power consump-
tion. According to the synthesis results, while increasing the
digit size is an effective way to reduce the dynamic power
consumption, it increases the leakage power. Since the leakage
power is negligible, we get lower total power consumption
as we increase the digit size. However, considering the gate
area, we should limit the digit size. Although Type 2 and
Type 3 show lower power consumptions than Type 1 when the
digit size is increased, since the gate area is larger, increasing
the digit size of Type 1 would be better choice rather than
choosing Type 2 or Type 3.
According to Zhou et al. [17], the maximal allowed power
for tags is less then 100 µW , and in [19], the author presents
30 µW for a security processor. ISO 18000-3 (13.56 MHz)
[18] requires the power consumption of less than 15 µW at
1.5 V to guarantee 1 m operating range. In our synthesis
results, if we increase the digit size, the power consumption
becomes close to 10 µW . This power consumption would be
low enough for even a passive tag.
A. Parallelism in ECP and general modular operations
The operations in the ECP are most critical in the number of
cycles, and afterwards come general modular operations. For
efficiency, the system is designed to run the EC operations
and the general modular operations in parallel. In the Schnorr
protocol, this parallelism is not useful since the general mod-
ular operations must be performed after the EC operations are
finished. However, depending on the protocol, this parallelism
can effectively reduce the number of cycles.
B. Required memory space of ROM and RAM
The required memory amount is dependent on the crypto-
graphic protocol. In the case of Schnorr protocol, the required
memories are summarized in Table XV. Note that one block
of memory is 21 bytes, and 2 extra bytes are required in RAM
which are used for modular operations. During the modular
operations, the block 0 and the block 1 of RAM require an
extra byte each (refer to Table VI).
TABLE XV
REQUIRED MEMORIES FOR SCHNORR PROTOCOL
Memory Size
ROM for program 25 bytes
ROM for data 4 blocks = 84 bytes
RAM 5 blocks + 2 bytes = 107 bytes
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C. Memory Access
The synthesis results do not include ROM and RAM and
hence the power consumption should be considered separately.
The number of memory access for Schnorr protocol is summa-
rized in Table XVI to give an idea for the estimation of power
consumption in memory. Note that the number of memory
accesses is independent of the digit size of the ECP. Type 1
reads ROM more than Type 2 and Type 3 since it does not
have a register for the EC base point (it has to read the base
point every time it is needed). There is no difference between
Type 2 and Type 3 except in the register file type in the ECP.
TABLE XVI
MEMORY ACCESS FOR SCHNORR PROTOCOL
Memory Read Write
Type 1 ROM 4,330 times –RAM 3,911 times 3,448 times
Type 2 ROM 928 times –RAM 3,911 times 3,448 times
Type 3 ROM 928 times –RAM 3,911 times 3,448 times
* One byte is accessed on each time.
D. Comparison with Related Work
Table XVII shows the comparison with related work. Even
though the key size of [20] is much smaller than ours, it
has a larger gate area and a larger number of cycles (when
the digit size is more than one). The result of [21] shows
15,094 gates which is still larger than the digit size of 3 of our
proposal and requires more than three times cycles. The results
of [22] also show a larger gate area and a larger number of
cycles. Among related work (except for our designs), [19] has
the least power consumption. Though the power consumption
is smaller than our design of the digit size 1, the delay is
much larger. Moreover, in our design the power consumption
can be effectively reduced by increasing the digit size. One
notable thing is that only our designs can perform the general
modular operations. Based on this comparison, our designs
require small gate areas and small numbers of cycles, and
consume small power and energy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We propose a compact architecture of an EC based security
processor for RFID. For a compact ECP, we introduced
several techniques such as the common Z-coordinate system,
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TABLE XVII
COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORK
Ref. PKC Digit Area Cycles CMOS Freq. Perf. Power Energy per OperationsSize (gates) (µm) (KHz) (msec) (µW ) op. (µJ)
1 12,506 275,816
0.13
1,130 244.08 36.63 8.94 Point Mult.,
This ECC GF(2163) 2 14,064 144,842 590 245.49 21.55 5.29 General
Work Type 1 3 14,729 101,183 411 246.19 15.75 3.88 Modular4 15,356 78,544 323 243.17 12.08 2.94 Operation
[20] ECC GF(p), N/A 18,720 205,225 0.13 500 410 394 161.5 ECDSA
p = (2101 + 1)/3
[21] ECC GF(2163) N/A 15,094 376,864 0.35 13,560 31.8 N/A N/A Point Mult.
[22] ECC GF(p160) N/A 19,000 362,000 0.35 N/A N/A N/A N/A ECDSAECC GF(p192) 23,600 502,000 83,333 6 141,000 846.0
N/A N/A
0.35 60 7,100 30
N/A Point Mult.[19](1) ECC GF(2191) 23,818 0.18 175 2,500 30
0.09 545 800 30
* All the results are based on one EC scalar multiplication.
(1) This work is a unified solution with GF(p192).
the register reuse and a circular shift register file. We also
proposed an algorithm for general modular operations with
a redundant representation using a few extra guard bits. By
utilizing the remainder bits of long scalars, we designed an
efficient modular operation algorithm without overhead. The
designed modular operations are not only computationally
efficient but also reduce memory requirement compared to
conventional modular algorithms. Moreover the ECP and the
modular operation, which are the most two critical operations,
can be performed in parallel so that the number of cycles
can be effectively reduced depending on the cryptographic
protocol.
We synthesized the proposed architectures with 0.13 µm
CMOS technology for three different types and for different
digit sizes of the ECP to show trade-offs for the number of
cycle number, gate area and power consumption. Compared
to other reported results, our architecture not only minimizes
the gate area and power consumption but also shows better
performance. According to the synthesis results, the power
consumption can be reduced to near to 10 µW which would
be low enough even for a passive RFID tag.
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